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ADVOCATING EQUALITY: JUDGE THEODORE MCMILLIAN’S 
CIVIL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE AND ST. MARY’S HONOR 
CENTER V. HICKS 
LELAND WARE* 
THE EARLY YEARS: SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 
Judge Theodore McMillian was born in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1919.  His 
family resided in a run-down neighborhood at Fourteenth street and Papin.1  
Judge McMillian’s parents separated when he was seven years old.  (Both 
parents subsequently remarried).  McMillian attended Vashon High School in 
St. Louis and subsequently enrolled in Lincoln University in Jefferson City, 
Missouri.  These were all racially-segregated institutions.  During the 1930’s 
and 40’s, an elaborate system of state-sponsored segregation governed the 
legal, economic and social relationships between whites and African-
Americans.  Opportunities for African-Americans were severely 
circumscribed.  When Theodore McMillian graduated Phi Beta Kappa from 
Lincoln in 1941, the racial barriers were such that the best employment he 
could obtain was a position as a dining-car waiter on the railroad.2 
McMillian planned to save money to attend graduate school but his plans 
were interrupted by the outbreak of World War II.  Like thousands of other 
Americans, McMillian was drafted into the military.  Although he served as an 
officer in the United States Army and fought alongside allied troops in France 
and Germany, he lived in segregated facilities and was barred from the white 
officer’s clubs.  When he was discharged in 1946, McMillian achieved the 
rank of First Lieutenant in the Army’s Signal Corps. 
 
*Leland Ware, Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Marguerite Shepard, ‘Do-Gooder’ Who Knows the Score, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, 
Nov. 18, 1967, at 1F; James Floyd, He Came Up the Hard Way: Judge Theodore McMillian May 
be Named to U.S. Court of Appeals, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, July 15, 1978, at 1F; William 
J. Shaw, Why Judge McMillian Worries, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH MAGAZINE, Aug. 11, 1991, 
at 9. 
 2. Shepard, supra note 1, at 1F; Floyd, supra note 1, at 1F; Shaw, supra note 1, at 9. 
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PURSUING A CAREER IN THE LAW 
After the War, Theodore McMillian returned to St. Louis and enrolled in 
law school at St. Louis University.3  By this time, McMillian had a wife and 
young child to support.  His veteran’s educational benefits did not cover all of 
his expenses.  To make ends meet he found a part-time job.  “Every morning 
he got up at five o’clock and went to the Samuel Shoe Company, where he 
cleaned toilets and washed windows before his eight a.m. law classes.”4  
McMillian graduated at the top of his class in 1949 after becoming the first 
African-American to be admitted to Alpha Sigma Nu, a Jesuit Honor Society.5 
After he completed his law studies, McMillian established a practice with 
Alphonse Lynch, the only other African-American in his class at Saint Louis 
University.  In 1952, McMillian decided to enter the political arena. 
He ran for Nineteenth Ward Committeeman.  In an interview with a 
reporter that appeared several years later, Judge McMillian recalled his defeat 
stating that, “I was beaten terribly.”  During the campaign however, McMillian 
supported several democratic office-seekers.  His efforts on behalf of the 
successful Circuit Attorney candidate, Edward L. Dowd Sr., led to his 
appointment as an Assistant Circuit Attorney in 1953.  It was in this capacity 
that McMillian proved himself as a skillful trial attorney.  A string of victories 
and his successful prosecution of a prominent local politician cemented his 
reputation in legal circles. 
In 1956, Governor Phil Donnelly appointed McMillian to serve as a Circuit 
Court Judge in the City of St. Louis.  A 1956 newspaper article noted that 
McMillian was “the first negro ever made a Circuit Judge in the state.”6  
During the mid-1960s, Judge McMillian presided over the St. Louis Juvenile 
Court.  In 1972, he advanced further in the judiciary with his appointment to 
the Missouri Court of Appeals.7  Then, in 1979, President Jimmy Carter 
appointed him to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.8  
McMillian was the first African-American appointed to these positions. 
 
 3. The first African-American undergraduates enrolled in 1944. 
 4. Shepard, supra note 1, at 1F. 
 5. First St.L.U. Negro Named to Jesuit Honor Fraternity, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, 
Feb. 19, 1949, at 1A. 
 6. John R. Hahn, Judge McMillian in Good Position to Aid His Race, ST. LOUIS GLOBE 
DEMOCRAT, Mar. 22, 1956, at 3A. 
 7. Hearns Names First Black Judge to Appeals Court Here, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, 
Oct. 25, 1972, at 4A; Harry Wilson, Jr., From Tenement to Court Bench—He’s Worked Hard, ST. 
LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 25, 1972, at 4A. 
 8. Edward H. Kohn, McMillian’s Judicial Record Shows Liberal Views, Dissent, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 1978, at 1C; Paul Wagman, McMillian Termed Ideal Choice For 
Appellate Post, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 9, 1978, at 1B. 
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AN ADVOCATE FOR EQUALITY 
Throughout his career Judge McMillian has been an advocate for racial 
equality and the rights of disadvantaged individuals.  Over the years he became 
a highly respected community leader, but never forgot his roots.  In his 
frequent public speeches and comments to the press, Judge McMillian did not 
hesitate to condemn racial and economic injustice.9  During his years as a 
juvenile court judge, he urged community leaders to improve the conditions of 
St. Louis’ most impoverished residents.  Judge McMillian devoted his off-duty 
hours to working with several civic and social organizations that served 
economically and socially disadvantaged individuals.  For example, in 1965 he 
was elected chairman of the board of the St. Louis Human Development 
Corporation, a local anti-poverty agency.10  He also served as the chairman of 
the advisory board of the Herbert Hoover Boys Club.11 
Judge McMillian’s judicial philosophy reflects his long-standing concern 
for the rights of minorities and other disadvantaged individuals.  During a 1978 
interview he expressed, “I’m a great believer in individual rights.  I’m a great 
believer in the Bill of Rights.”12  In an interview with a St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
reporter that appeared during the pendency of his nomination to the Eighth 
Circuit, Judge McMillian said, “I want to be able to help the unfortunates, 
impoverished and disenchanted– those that need equal justice under the law.”13 
Responding to another reporter’s questions about his judicial philosophy Judge 
McMillian elaborated: “I’m not an ultra-conservative but I’m not one of these 
misty-eyed sentimentalists either.  I have great regard for individual rights and 
 
 9. Judge Backs Proposal To Let Poor Persons Sign Own Bail Bond: McMillian Says 
Present Requirements Deny Equal Justice to the Indigent, Feb. 11, 1963, at 7A; Robert Teuscher, 
The Trials and Tribulations of a Juvenile Judge: Lack of a Normal Home Life is Responsible For 
Plight of Many Youngsters Who Wind Up in His Court, Asserts Theodore A. McMillian, ST. 
LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, Dec. 24, 1966, at 1C; Judge McMillian Urges Ghetto Understanding, 
ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, June 13, 1967, at 4A; Legal Aid to Poor Is Force Against Chaos, 
Says Judge, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 24, 1967, at 3A; George Morrison, Growing 
Negro Anger: Judge Cites Famine and Hardship as the Reasons, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, 
Mar. 28, 1969, at 16A; Urges Police to Treat Ghetto Youths Humanely, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 1969, at 19A; Lack of Equality for Negroes Is Called Threat to Leadership, 
ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, May 16, 1969, at 9A; McMillian Blames Society For Failure of 
Ghetto Children, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, May 23, 1969, at 4A; Judge Urges Courts to 
Provide Help for Youths, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, May 17, 1977, at 6B. 
 10. Judge McMillian Heads Anti-Poverty Agency, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 21, 
1965, at 3A; Marguerite Shepard, McMillian Re-elected Head Of St. Louis HDC Board, ST. 
LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 25, 1967, at 12A. 
 11. Sue Ann Wood, Ground Broken for Boys’ Club, ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 9, 
1966, at 3A. 
 12. Kohn, supra note 8, at 1C. 
 13. Gerald M. Boyd, McMillian Nominated to Federal Judgeship, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 1978, at 8A. 
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freedom and they must be protected, but I also believe society has rights to be 
preserved and protected.”14 
This progressive philosophy—an unyielding support for the rights of 
individuals and a commitment to equal justice—is reflected in Judge 
McMillian’s decisions.  During his twenty years on the Eighth Circuit, Judge 
McMillian has authored scores of opinions in Civil Rights cases.  Some of 
these are reproduced in law school casebooks as examples of the proper 
application of statutory principles.15  Another example of Judge McMillian’s 
jurisprudence can be found in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, a case which 
altered the burden of proof in employment discrimination litigation. 16 
“PRETEXT PLUS” OR “PRETEXT ONLY”: ST. MARY’S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from 
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity and national 
origin.17  In the years following the enactment of Title VII, two predominate 
theories emerged: disparate treatment and disparate impact.18  Disparate impact 
cases focus on the discriminatory effect of facially-neutral employment 
policies.19  In such cases plaintiffs are not required to prove intent.20  It is 
enough to show a policy causes a disparate impact that is not supported by a 
business necessity.  Disparate treatment cases, in contrast, involve episodes of 
intentional discrimination. 
Unlike disparate impact cases, the disparate treatment theory requires 
plaintiffs to prove discriminatory motive.  The burden of proof in disparate 
treatment cases was established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.21  To prevail 
a plaintiff must first establish a prima-facie case by showing that she applied 
 
 14. Floyd, supra note 1, at 3F. 
 15. See, e.g., Locke v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 660 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1981) 
reprinted JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN AND GEORGE M. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed.) (explaining an aspect of the relief available 
to prevailing plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases). Id. 
 16. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1964) (“[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”) 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 18. For a discussion of the development of the two theories, see generally William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreward: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 30-31 
(1994); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and 
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 383 (1995). 
 19. International. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
 20. Id. 
 21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); Texas Dep’t of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
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for an available position, that she possessed the requisite qualifications and that 
she was not selected.22  Thereafter, the employer must state a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its decision.23  If the employer satisfies its rebuttal 
obligation, the plaintiff can obtain a favorable judgment if she proves that the 
proffered justification is pretextual and that the employer’s actions were 
actually motivated by discriminatory animus.24 
The McDonnell Douglas paradigm assumes that direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive is not available.  The proof in such cases consists of 
indirect evidence.  In the late nineteen eighties a question emerged regarding 
the consequence of proof of pretext.25  Some courts held that a demonstration 
of pretext compelled a judgment for the plaintiff.26  Others concluded that 
proof of pretext did not automatically result in a judgment for the plaintiff.27  
The confusion concerned the significance of inferences in disparate treatment 
cases. The debate reached the Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. 
Hicks. 
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION 
Hicks involved the discharge of an African-American prison guard at a 
Missouri correctional facility.28  During the trial, the plaintiff established a 
prima-facie case under the disparate treatment theory, and he also proved, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the reason given for his discharge was false.29  
 
 22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The 
Fallacy of the “Pretext Plus” Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 
(1991); Hannah Arterion Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme 
Court’s Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 
353 (1984). 
 26. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512-513 (1993) (listing cases 
that follow “pretext-only”); Tye v. Board of Educ. of Polaris Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811 
F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 
881 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-1396 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Lopez v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 880 (1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 
(11th Cir. 1990); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 639-640 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
 27. See, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512 (listing cases that follow pretext-plus); EEOC v. Flasher 
Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 
282-283 (6th Cir. 1991); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991); Holder v. 
City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-828 (4th Cir. 1989); Benzies v. Ill. Dept. of Mental Health 
and Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 
(1987); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 28. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
 29. Id. at 1250. 
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Despite this showing, the trial court entered a judgment for the employer.30  
The trial judge found that the plaintiff had proven pretext—that the defendant 
lied about its reason for discharging the plaintiff—but this evidence did not 
prove that the termination was motivated by discriminatory animus:31 
[a]lthough plaintiff has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he 
has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally 
motivated . . . [P]laintiff has succeeded in proving that the violations for which 
he was disciplined were pretextual reasons for his demotion and discharge.  
Plaintiff has not, however, proven by direct evidence or inference that his 
unfair treatment was motivated by his race.32 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.33 Writing for the 
panel, Judge McMillian noted that there was no evidentiary basis for the trial 
judge’s conclusion. As a consequence, it was “improper for the district court to 
assume – without evidence to support the assumption - that defendant’s actions 
were somehow ‘personally motivated.’”34  The panel held that under these 
circumstances, the only inference that could be drawn was that the supervisor’s 
actions were motivated by discriminatory animus.  To support this conclusion, 
Judge McMillian relied on well-established precedent.  Quoting the majority’s 
opinion in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,35 Judge McMillian explained 
that: 
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of 
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, 
are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors. . . .  And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from 
our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary 
manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.  
Thus, when all legitimate reasons for [the adverse employment action] have 
been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely 
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, 
based [its] decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.36 
Because the proffered justification was proven to be false in Hicks the 
Eighth Circuit held that: “If the plaintiff has met his or her burden of proof at 
the pretext stage . . . the plaintiff has satisfied his or her ultimate burden of 
persuasion.  No additional proof of discrimination is required.”37  This 
 
 30. Id. at 1253. 
 31. Id. at 1252. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hicks, 970 F.2d at 493. 
 34. Id. at 492. 
 35. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
 36. Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492. 
 37. Id. at 493. 
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interpretation recognizes that an inference of discriminatory intent can be 
drawn from evidence demonstrating pretext. 
THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION IN HICKS 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision.38  Writing for the majority, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia 
emphasized that a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case is obligated to 
establish that discriminatory intent motivated the employer’s decision.39  
Evidence which disproves the employer’s proffered justification, does not 
necessarily satisfy this obligation.40  Justice Scalia argued that “a reason cannot 
be proved to be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the 
reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”41 An employer 
may be dishonest about its rationale for terminating an employee; however, the 
employer’s falsehood is not a pretext for discrimination in every situation.42  
 
 38. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 525 (1993). 
 39. Id. at 511 (relying on the analysis of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine which emphasized 
that the burden of proving discriminatory animus always remains with the plaintiff). Id. 
 40. Id. at 515-18.  It should be noted that this interpretation is inconsistent with the holding 
in Burdine where the Court found that a plaintiff could succeed “either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 450 U.S. at 256.  To justify 
this departure from precedent the majority in Hicks found that this passage was inadvertent and 
wholly inconsistent with the remaining analysis in Burdine. Id. Several commentators have 
criticized this strained construction.  See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the 
“Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183 (1997); Robert Brookins, Hicks, 
Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1995); 
Derrick L. Horner, Toward Clarifying the Ambiguity of Merging Burdens—St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993), 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 205 (1994); Louis M. 
Rappaport, Note, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned Its Back on 
Title VII By Rejecting “Pretext- Only?”, 39 VILL. L. REV. 123 (1994). 
 41. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added). The majority relied on the common law rules 
of presumptions to conclude that once a presumption has been rebutted, the plaintiff retains the 
ultimate burden of persuasion and “nothing in  law would permit us to substitute for the required 
finding that the employer’s action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different 
(and much lesser) finding, that the employer’s explanation of its action was not believable.” Id. at 
514-15 (emphasis added). 
 42. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519-24.  See also Veatch v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 730 F. 
Supp. 809, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that, “even if the employer lies about the real reasons for 
the firing, other reasons, not impermissible under federal law, might be suggested by the 
evidence.”) Id.; Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden 
of Proof After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963 (1994); Julyn M. 
McCarty & Michael J. Levy, Focusing Title VII: The Supreme Court Continues the Battle Against 
Intentional Discrimination in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 177 
(1996). 
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Employers may have other motives that they choose not to reveal.43  In the 
majority’s view, the “pretext only” approach was not consistent with the 
plaintiff s obligation to prove discriminatory intent, since it did not allow for 
this possibility.44 
Justice Scalia also argued that proponents of the “pretext only” standard 
failed to appreciate the limitations of a prima-facie case.45  This threshold 
showing merely establishes that the plaintiff applied for an available position 
and possessed the requisite qualifications.46  If the plaintiff was a member of a 
protected group and the position remained open, or someone else was selected, 
a presumption of discrimination arises.47  However, once the employer 
articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “[t]he presumption [of 
discrimination], having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come 
forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture.”48 After this 
initial phase, the case proceeds to the next level of inquiry: whether the 
employer’s decision was based on unlawful discrimination.49  If the plaintiff 
proves that the employer’s proffered justification is not true, she still has an 
obligation to persuade the fact-finder that the employer was motivated by 
discriminatory animus.50  In Justice Scalia’s view, “[i]t is not enough, in other 
words, to disbelieve the employer; the fact-finder must believe the plaintiff’s 
explanation of intentional discrimination.”51  As the discussion in the following 
sections demonstrates, this flawed interpretation confuses the plaintiff’s 
ultimate burden of proving discriminatory intent with the requirement of 
establishing an evidentiary foundation for an inference of discriminatory 
motive. 
MODIFYING BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES 
The holding in Hicks was controversial.  Commentators complained that it 
distorted the adversarial process and reduced the McDonnell Douglas approach 
 
 43. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 523-24. 
 44. Id. at 511-12. 
 45. Id. at 509. 
 46. Id. at 513. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11.  This characterization of a presumption disappearing from the 
case is consistent with the common law view of presumptions, often known as the “bursting 
bubble” theory, and has been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 301.  See generally Lanctot, 
supra note 25, at 104. 
 49. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11. 
 50. Id. at 519. 
 51. Id. at 519.  To support this interpretation Justice Scalia also relied on Rule 301 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence which states that a presumption shifts the burden of production rather 
than the overall burden of proof. Id. 
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to an “empty ritual.”52 At minimum, Hicks modified the McDonnell Douglas 
paradigm and imposed a heightened and unwarranted proof regime, making it 
far more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate treatment cases.53  If the 
holding in Hicks meant only that proof of pretext does not always compel a 
judgment for the plaintiff, it would not be an unreasonable interpretation of the 
burden of proof in disparate treatment cases.  Hicks does not endorse “pretext 
only” or “pretext plus.”  Rather, it attempts to chart a course that flows 
between these interpretations.  This is made clear by Justice Scalia’s reluctant 
concession that proof of pretext is all the evidence that is needed to prevail on 
the merits: 
The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant 
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, 
together with elements of the prima-facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination.  Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will 
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.54 
Justice Scalia’s analysis is premised on his concern that an employer who 
deliberately lies in formal legal proceedings may have a nondiscriminatory 
reason for its’ actions which were never disclosed.  The problem with this 
premise, as Justice Souter makes clear in his dissent, is that it does not reflect 
an accurate understanding of what occurs in civil actions.55  The discovery 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to eliminate 
surprises in civil litigation.56  Trials in discrimination cases take place after 
extensive pre-trial discovery.  The key individuals in the decision-making 
process will have been deposed.  The employer’s rebuttal burden obligates it to 
state some reason for its adverse action.57 Any personnel records or other 
documents which reflect (or are inconsistent with) the employer’s decision will 
have been produced and examined prior to the trial.58 
 
 52. Brodin, supra note 40, at 200-10 (commenting that Hicks distorts the litigation process 
and makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail) Id.; See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., 
Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and The Supreme Court: A Reform Program For Title 
VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 241 (1994). 
 53. Culp, supra note 52, at 1009-10.  There is also a bitter irony in Hicks—dishonest 
defendants are not penalized for their mendacity.  As one commentator observed, “[t]he defendant 
lies and the plaintiff loses.” Lanctot, supra note 25. 
 54. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
 55. Id. at 536. 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983 Amendment) (“The purpose of 
discovery is to provide a mechanism for making relevant information available to the litigants.  
‘Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation.’” (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)). 
 57. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (“[I]f the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the 
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.”) Id. 
 58. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) provides: “a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: (A) the name . . . of each individual likely to have discoverable 
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After the close of discovery, the court may order parties to submit detailed 
pre-trial statements indicating, among other things, the disputed and 
undisputed facts.59  These statements provide the basis for the final, pre-trial 
order.60  This order limits the scope of the trial.61  It identifies the witnesses, 
summarizes their testimony and describes all of the documentary evidence that 
will be presented.62 When the trial finally takes place, the parties and their 
attorneys know what testimony and documentary evidence will be produced.  
There are rarely any unanticipated developments during the trial.  Evidence 
that is not identified in the pre-trial statement may be disallowed.63 Given this 
process, it is unlikely that during the trial the actual reason for an employer’s 
decision will emerge for the first time entirely unanticipated by the parties or 
their attorneys.64  Hicks fails to recognize this reality.  This is why many 
commentators correctly observed that Hicks distorted the view of the 
adversarial process and redefined the McDonnell Douglas order and allocation 
of proof in a manner that was not warranted.65  These criticisms are well 
founded, but there is more to the Court’s decision than the existing 
commentary suggests. 
In Hicks, the trial judge disregarded the implications of the supervisor’s 
dishonest testimony and found a neutral reason for supervisor’s actions: a 
reason not supported by any evidence presented during the trial.66  The court 
seemingly believed any motivation for the employer’s actions except unlawful 
discrimination.  This “any reason but discrimination” approach assumes a 
society in which racial and other biases have been eliminated.67  Under this 
view, discriminatory animus would be among the least likely motivations for 
 
information relevant to disputed facts; (B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, 
all documents . . . that are relevant to disputed facts”.  Id. 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c). 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e) provides in part: “After any conference held pursuant to this rule, 
an order shall be entered reciting the action taken.  This order shall control the subsequent course 
of the action unless modified by a subsequent order.”  Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c). 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e) allows the pretrial order only to be modified to “prevent manifest 
injustice.”  Id. 
 64. MICHAEL ZIMMER ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
106 (3d ed. 1994). 
 65. See generally Brodin, supra note 40, at 209-10. 
 66. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1244, (holding that personal animosity was the reason for the 
employer’s action, although that reason had not been proffered by the defendant). Id. 
 67. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 
Civil Rights Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (1993); 
Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 
CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National 
Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] ADVOCATING EQUALITY 1319 
an employer’s actions.68  This doubt and reluctance has implications beyond 
the modifications that Hicks made to existing precedent.  It is infecting the 
lower courts’ evaluation of civil rights claims and creating a heightened burden 
of proof for plaintiffs. 
Despite false testimony exposed during the trial and a pattern of adverse 
actions against African-American employees generally, and Hicks in 
particular, the trial judge was not persuaded that the supervisor’s actions were 
motivated by discrimination.  This reluctance to believe that discrimination 
regularly occurs is infecting the courts’ evaluation of civil rights claims.  This 
imposes an unacknowledged burden on plaintiffs that cannot be justified.  A 
plaintiff must surmount the court’s underlying skepticism as well as meeting 
the formal burdens of persuasion.69 
THE IMPOSITION OF A HEIGHTENED PROOF REGIME 
The critical flaw in Hicks is the way in which the majority misconstrued 
the significance of inferences that are permitted by an adequate evidentiary 
foundation.70 Justice Scalia acknowledged that a fact-finder could infer 
discriminatory motive from the plaintiff’s proof of pretext, but he was 
unwilling to recognize the likelihood of this conclusion.71  If the employer lies 
about the reason that it fired the plaintiff, it is more likely than not that the 
actual reason is one that is adverse to its interests.72  In most cases the fact-
finder is presented with evidence of two alternatives; a discriminatory motive 
 
 68. Culp, supra note 52 (arguing that courts can always point to neutral non-discriminatory 
actions such as economics to explain any employment action). 
 69. Laura Gatland, Courts Behaving Badly: Task Forces Say Some Judges Impatient With 
Job Bias Cases, 83 A.B.A. J. 30 (1997).  This article reported that surveys conducted in the 
Ninth, Second, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits found that lawyers believe that trial 
judges downplay the importance of employment discrimination claims.  Id.  A Second Circuit 
Task Force concluded that trial judges appeared to believe that discrimination cases were too 
trivial for their attention. Id.  The Eighth Circuit’s Task Force reported that judges seem impatient 
with sex discrimination claims and that cases were concluded without adequate time for 
discovery. Id.  The Task Force for the Ninth Circuit reported similar complaints. Id.  Although 
these surveys reflect findings in three federal circuits, they evidence a widespread sentiment 
among attorneys who represent plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Id. 
 70. Fact-finders are allowed to draw any inference that is reasonable in light of the facts 
proven. 12 EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 72.04 at 619 (3d ed. 1977) (“[The factfinder is] permitted to draw, from facts 
which you find have been proved, such reasonable inferences as seems justified in the light of 
your experience.”). 
 71. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
 72. The “adverse inference” rule is a long-standing common law principle.  When a litigant 
withholds evidence, the inference should be drawn that the undisclosed evidence would be 
unfavorable to that party.  WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 285 (Chadborn Rev. 1979).  See generally 
Brodin, supra note 40, at 212. 
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versus one that is legitimate.  In Hicks and the vast majority of Title VII cases 
there is no evidence which would support a third conclusion. 
The logic of an inference of discriminatory animus is even more apparent 
when one considers that an employer can escape liability by disclosing any 
justification for its decision.73  It is not necessary that the reason be a rational 
one.  It could be entirely capricious or illegal under other laws as long as it is 
not based on discriminatory animus.74  Given the range of options that are 
available, why would an employer lie except to hide a discriminatory motive?  
As individuals familiar with the litigation process know, the risks posed by 
dishonest testimony during a trial are unusually high.  At the conclusion of a 
trial an instruction is given that the jury can choose to disbelieve any or all of a 
witness’ testimony if any part of it is shown to be untrustworthy.75  This means 
that if any portion of a key witness’s testimony is shown to be false, the 
credibility of the entire case is considerably and often fatally, undermined.  By 
failing to recognize this, Hicks painted a distorted picture of the litigation 
process.  An inference of discriminatory intent is the most logical inference if 
the proffered justification is proven to be false.  In most cases, the evidence 
will not support a different conclusion.  
Hicks also imposes an unwarranted evidentiary burden on plaintiffs.  
Despite its purported embrace of the permissive standard, there are passages 
within the majority’s opinion that strongly suggest a “pretext plus” 
requirement.76  To justify his rejection of the compulsory inference, Justice 
Scalia emphasized that a false justification for discharging an employee does 
not violate Title VII “unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that 
discrimination was the real reason.”77 In another passage, Justice Scalia 
reiterated this point stating that a plaintiff cannot prevail merely by showing 
that the employer lied about its reason for discharging the plaintiff.78  He 
emphasized that, “[t]he fact-finder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of 
intentional discrimination.”79 
 
 73. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-258. 
 74. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-613 (1993) holding that the employer 
can rely on a reason that is illegal under other laws); Purkett v. Elem., 514 U.S. 765, 775 (1995) 
(facially implausible, silly, or fantastic reasons are sufficient to satisfy the employer’s rebuttal 
burden). 
 75. 12 EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 73.04 at 619 (3d ed. 1977) (“If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified 
falsely concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust such witness’s testimony in 
other particulars; and you may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as 
you may think it deserves.”). 
 76. See generally Terri L. Dill, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Refining the Burdens of 
Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 48 ARK. L. REV. 617 (1995). 
 77. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515. 
 78. Id. at 519. 
 79. Id. 
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This analysis suggests two separate levels of proof: the first showing that 
the proffered justification is false; the second demonstrating that the actual 
reason for the employer’s action is grounded in unlawful discrimination.  
These passages coupled with Justice Scalia’s insistence that the presumption 
created by the prima-facie case “simply drops out of the picture”80 imply an 
obligation to produce evidence of pretext as well as independent proof of 
discriminatory intent.  But this is not what is actually required.  It is important 
to note that disparate treatment cases presume the absence of direct evidence of 
discrimination.  Because there is no “smoking gun” evidence, a finding of 
discriminatory motive is based on proof that provides a foundation for an 
inference of intent.  Hence, if an employer proffers a false reason for its 
actions, the fact-finder is permitted to infer a discriminatory motive.  This 
inference is permissive rather than mandatory, but it will be the most logical 
one in most cases. 
By insisting that the evidence of pretext must also prove discriminatory 
intent the majority in Hicks has heightened the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden to 
a level that is entirely unwarranted.  Justice Scalia’s analysis confused the 
plaintiff’s ultimate burden – to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the 
employer’s actions were motivated by discrimination – with the obligation to 
produce the evidence needed to establish a foundation for an inference of 
intent.  However, as Judge McMillian explained in the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion, evidence demonstrating pretext provides an adequate foundation for 
an inference of motive, “no additional proof of discrimination is required.”81  
The heightened proof regime imposed by Hicks is based on faulty analysis and 
has made it far more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate treatment 
cases.  This new evidentiary requirement will prevent plaintiffs with legitimate 
claims from prevailing against the perpetrators of unlawful employment 
practices.82 
 
 80. Id. at 511. 
 81. Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492. 
 82. The flawed analysis in Hicks has caused considerable confusion in the evaluation of 
summary judgment motions in disparate treatment cases.  Some circuits have adopted a “pretext 
only” approach under which evidence of pretext is sufficient to defeat a defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment.  Others have embraced a “pretext plus” approach which requires plaintiffs to 
produce evidence showing that the defendant’s proffered justification is both false and a pretext 
for unlawful discrimination.  See generally Karen W. Kramer, Overcoming Higher Hurdles: 
Shifting the Burden of Proof after Hicks and Ezold, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404 (1995); Jody H. 
Odell, Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 
and Its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251 (1994); Julie Tang and 
Hon. Theodore M. McMillian, Eighth Circuit Employment Discrimination Law: Hicks and Its 
Impact on Summary Judgment, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 519 (1997).  The “pretext plus approach” 
that some circuits require fails to recognize that a plaintiff can prevail on the merits on the basis 
of proof of pretext alone.  The “pretext-plus” interpretation misconstrues the plaintiff’s burden of 
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CONCLUSION 
In a speech that was delivered during a Dr. Martin Luther King birthday 
celebration, Judge McMillian expressed his concerns about the current 
direction of the federal judiciary: 
[A]ll of our victories of the 1960s are at risk; victories by those who risked 
their lives by following and supporting Reverend Martin Luther King and 
other courageous men and women in the struggle for civil rights.  Our schools 
are being re-segregated; affirmative action is dying.  The Supreme Court, the 
last forum for civil rights, is now controlled by conservative justices appointed 
by President Reagan.  They have used a deft scalpel to whittle away at the 
rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1972.83 
Judge McMillian is in a unique position to evaluate the direction of the 
Supreme Court.  When he enrolled in segregated Lincoln University in the late 
1930’s he could not attend the University of Missouri.  At the time another 
Lincoln graduate, Lloyd Gaines, was challenging that institution’s exclusion of 
African-American students.  The Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada84 was the first in a long line of cases in which the 
African-American student successfully challenged segregation laws in the 
courts.  In the late 1940’s, when Judge McMillian was a student at St. Louis 
University, the Supreme Court decided Shelley v. Kraemer,85 the case that 
struck down racially restrictive covenants.  A few years later when Judge 
McMillian was an Assistant Circuit Attorney, the Supreme Court issued its 
1954 decision,  Brown v. Board of Education,86 which declared segregation in 
public schools unconstitutional.  During the years that he presided over the 
Juvenile Court, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 
These were years of progress towards racial equality.  The system of state-
sponsored segregation was eliminated, in large measure, by an enlightened 
federal judiciary.  This trend changed dramatically in the late 1980’s when the 
current Supreme Court majority was completed by a series of Reagan 
appointments.  Justice Scalia’s analysis in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 
reflects the current majority’s regressive approach to civil rights issues.  It is 
not a posture that is receptive to the claims of plaintiffs in civil rights cases.  It 
is not an approach that advocates equality. 
 
 
production because it requires more evidence at the summary judgment phase than a plaintiff 
needs to prevail at the trial. 
 83. William H. Shaw, Why Judge McMillian Worries, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 11, 
1991. 
 84. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
 85. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 86. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
